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Project Curia
What do we want our politics to be?
An essay on three democratic principles America claims to uphold, and the seven reforms most Americans, across both parties, support.
Jake Enos
May 2026
Segment 01
Introduction
Putting aside partisanship, what would we like our politics to be? This is a
question that I've been pondering the past couple of years, and I think
taking a moment to consider its answer may produce some insight as to how we
might want to think about and interact with current events and other
citizens.
Albert Einstein is reported to have remarked that "politics is more
difficult than physics."1 He was suggesting that making decisions
through argument and compromise is harder than understanding the universe.
Although a light-hearted comment, there seems to be some truth in it. But before we can ask why politics is hard, we should ask what
politics even is, and why it deserves our attention in the first place.
Aristotle observed that "man is by nature a political animal."2 Politics
is how we figure out how to live together given that we don't all agree on
what that should look like. It is not merely the cost of living among one
another but the very means by which we make a shared life possible.
So, what do we want our politics to be?
Where we are today
Democracy is not a single, unchanging framework. Democracies vary widely in
their structures, presidential or parliamentary, two-party or multi-party,
federal or unitary, and citizens disagree about which choices are best. But
beneath these structural differences, democracies share a set of core
claims: that political power derives from the people, that representatives
are accountable to those they represent, that every citizen has a voice.
The gap worth examining is not between America's structure and some
idealized alternative, but between the claims our system makes about itself
and what it actually delivers.
What democracy claims to deliver, and where the American version falls short.
Segment 02
Principle #1. Every citizen has an equal political voice
If any principle could claim to be foundational to democracy, this would be
it. The word itself, coined in ancient Athens, joined dēmos (the people)
with kratos (rule). Democracy was defined, from the beginning, by what it
was not: it was not oligarchy, the rule of the wealthy few, and it was not
tyranny, the rule of one. This political framework was specifically built to
ensure that no citizen's voice carried disproportionate weight in the
governance of the whole.
When the United States declared its independence from Great Britain, the
drafters wrote that "governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed." When the Constitution was
written, it opened with "We the People of the United States," not "We the
Rulers of the United States." And over the past 250 years, the country has
repeatedly amended that document to widen who counts among "the People." The
15th Amendment established that race could not be used to deny the vote;
the 19th Amendment did the same for sex. The 24th Amendment prohibited poll
taxes, establishing that wealth could not be used as a barrier to political
participation. The 26th Amendment lowered the voting age to 18, ensuring
that young adults sent to fight the country's wars could also vote on the
policies that decided them.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the same principle. By the mid-twentieth
century, many state legislatures had become imbalanced. Some districts had
remained unchanged for decades despite massive population shifts, with a
vote in some districts worth many times a vote in others. In Reynolds v.
Sims (1964), the Court held that this was constitutionally intolerable,
and legislative districts would need to be drawn so that no citizen's vote
carries more weight than another's. "Legislators represent people, not
trees or acres," Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, establishing what has
become known as "one person, one vote."
Taken together, all of this amounts to a single claim: that whether you are
a citizen without a dollar to your name or a Wall Street financier, a rural
farmer whose nearest neighbor lives miles down the road or a city resident
whose apartment building holds more people than many American towns, you
should count equally in the decisions that govern you.
That is the principle, established and reaffirmed across nearly 250 years
of American history. The question is whether we have lived up to it.
Most Americans have already answered, and they have been answering the same
way for half a century. When the American National Election Studies first
put the question to a national sample in 1964, nearly two-thirds of
Americans said the government was run for the benefit of all the people.
Just 29 percent said it was run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves. By the mid-1970s, the country had inverted, and the "few big
interests" answer has held a clear majority in nearly every survey since.
If anything, the gap has widened. In 2024, more than four in five Americans
said the country is run by a few big interests.
American National Election Studies, Time Series Cumulative Data File (variable VCF0605). Years shown are years the question was asked. Percentages are of respondents giving one of the two main answers; volunteered “depends/other” responses excluded.
If we merely had a single data point, this wouldn't be as telling. People
can be wrong about their government. But when a majority of Americans,
sustained across half a century, keep reaching the same conclusion,
something is going on that has very little to do with which party is in
power. Republicans said it under Obama, Democrats said it under Trump, and
both said it under each other's predecessors. So the question worth asking
is not who they blame, but what they are responding to. And the natural
place to start is with the most visible piece of the system, the apparatus
through which "big interests" crowd out the voices of "the People."
Heads: I Win
In 2024, organized interests spent $4.4 billion on federal lobbying, money
paid to professional advocates working to shape legislation and regulation,
separate from any spending on elections themselves.1 To put that number
into perspective, it exceeds the annual profit of Starbucks.2 Every
store, every drink, every customer, across roughly 40,000 locations serving
tens of millions of customers every week, produces less in net earnings
each year than is spent in Washington trying to shape what the federal
government does.3 Put another way, over the past 15 years, more than
$53 billion has been spent on lobbying, an amount that has held steady
through recessions and pandemics and surged to record highs in recent
years, regardless of which party controlled the White House.4 That same
sum, redirected to the federal food assistance program, could have provided
a full year of grocery support to 24 million Americans, more than the
population of Florida.5
OpenSecrets analysis of Senate Office of Public Records data, opensecrets.org. Figures are annual totals in nominal dollars.
If lobbying did not work, it would not be a multi-billion dollar industry.
The firms paying for it are not in the habit of paying for things that do
not produce returns. The economic literature confirms what the spending
implies. A 2014 study in the American Economic Review found that while
both issue expertise and political connections drive what lobbyists are
paid, the monetary premium for connections is more consistent than the
premium for expertise.6 When their connected members move to new
committees, lobbyists follow them, regardless of subject matter. A separate
study, examining a tax provision passed in 2004, calculated that firms
received roughly $220 in tax savings for every dollar they spent lobbying
for it.7 To match that sort of return in a casino, you would have to
win eight blackjack hands in a row, doubling your stake each time, with
the odds of doing so roughly one in 250. Returns of that magnitude
are unusual. The more general finding is that lobbying is, in the strict
economic sense, a profitable allocation of resources.
The pattern isn't unique to corporations. The National Association of
Realtors (NAR) spent $86.3 million on federal lobbying in 2024, which was
more than any other single organization in Washington.8 The reason for
the surge is not difficult to find. In late 2023, a federal jury found NAR
liable for an antitrust conspiracy to inflate real estate commissions, and
the case would be settled in 2024 for $418 million.9 The settlement
required NAR to change the rules governing how its 1.5 million members are
paid for their work. The trade group was, in effect, lobbying to shape the
legislative and regulatory response to its own legal defeat.
One could reasonably argue that an organization representing realtors will
naturally lobby for realtors, and that this is what trade associations are
designed to do. The point is not that NAR shouldn't lobby. The point is the
scale at which it does, and the asymmetry that this scale represents. The
AFL-CIO, a federation of American unions representing roughly 12.5 million
workers across virtually every sector of the economy, spent $5.2 million
on federal lobbying in 2024.10 The National Education Association, the
country's largest single union, representing about 3 million public school
teachers and education staff, spent $2.8 million.11 The Service
Employees International Union, representing about 1.85 million workers in
healthcare, public services, and property services, spent under $1
million.12 NAR alone outspent these three organizations combined by
more than tenfold, even though they represent, collectively, more than ten
times as many Americans.
The natural question is why this is allowed.
The short answer is that it has always been protected. The First Amendment
guarantees "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." Lobbyists, in the strict
legal sense, are citizens exercising that right on behalf of clients who
pay them to do so.
James Madison, one of the Founding Fathers, anticipated this. Writing in
Federalist No. 10, he called organized interests "factions" and argued
they were inevitable in any free society. People hold different views and
form competing groups around their interests. Madison thought a free
country could not eliminate factions without eliminating freedom itself.
The remedy, he wrote, was to be found "in the means of controlling its
effects."13 So the system the Founders designed accepted that factions
would form, and worked instead to keep any one of them from dominating.
The country would be a large republic, with the people's views filtered
through elected representatives, and with so many varied factions across
the territory that no single one could easily assemble a stable majority.
Power would be split between the national government and the states, and
within the national government among three branches that could check one
another. This design would, ideally, lead to a country where factions
would have to compete. Madison's design assumed factions would compete. It
did not assume that the cost of competing would rise to a point where
most citizens could not afford to participate.
Tails: You Lose
Before every American football game, a coin is tossed. The winner chooses
how the game begins. In American politics, citizens like to think that at
least one side of the coin might land in their favor; that one of the two
great mechanisms of political influence might serve the people rather than
the few. In practice, both sides have come to serve big interests. Heads
or tails, the same names choose how the game begins, how it is played, and
how it ends. If lobbying calls the plays, campaign finance picks the
players. And no Supreme Court decision has shaped how players are picked
more than Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.14
In 2008, a conservative nonprofit called Citizens United produced a
ninety-minute documentary critical of Hillary Clinton, who was then running
for the Democratic presidential nomination. The group wanted to distribute
the film through video-on-demand during the primary season. The Federal
Election Commission held that doing so would violate a provision of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibited corporations and
unions from using their general funds to pay for "electioneering
communications" close to a federal election. Citizens United sued, and the
case worked its way to the Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments twice
and issued its decision on January 21, 2010.
By a vote of five to four, the Court held that the law violated the First
Amendment. The majority opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held
that political speech sits at the core of what the First Amendment
protects, and that the government cannot suppress political speech based
on the identity of the speaker. But what happens when that speaker is a
corporation or a union?
The Court's answer was that corporations and unions are associations of
citizens, and the political speech they fund deserves the same
constitutional protection as the speech of an individual. A 1990 precedent
that had upheld restrictions on corporate political spending was
overturned, along with the portion of a 2003 ruling that had upheld the
same restriction in the McCain-Feingold law.15 After the decision,
corporations and unions could spend unlimited amounts of their general
funds on independent political communications, as long as they did not
coordinate directly with a candidate's campaign.
And spend they did. In 2008, the last election cycle before the decision,
outside groups spent $574 million attempting to influence federal
elections. In 2024, that figure was $4.5 billion. Outside spending grew
nearly eightfold in fifteen years, faster than any other category of
political money.16
OpenSecrets, “Total Outside Spending by Cycle.” Includes independent expenditures, electioneering communications, and communication costs reported to the FEC.
If "We the People" are the quarterback in this game, calling the plays and
reading the field, Citizens United was the sack that rocked the
quarterback. And the play that followed made it even harder to get up.
Within months of Citizens United, a federal appeals court extended the
ruling's logic to political action committees, holding in SpeechNow.org
v. FEC that if independent expenditures could not be limited, then
contributions to committees making only independent expenditures could not
be limited either.17
The result was a new kind of political organization, the super PAC. Super
PACs can accept unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations,
and unions, and spend unlimited amounts on political activity, as long as
they do not coordinate directly with a candidate's campaign. They emerged
in 2010 and have grown into the dominant vehicle for outside spending in
federal elections. By 2024, super PACs were spending more on individual
races than the candidates' own campaigns.18
For example, the most expensive House primary in American history took
place that year in New York's 16th Congressional District, where the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) affiliated super PAC,
the United Democracy Project, spent $14.5 million to defeat Representative
Jamaal Bowman.19 The contributors funding that spending lived largely
outside the district, and the issue motivating their effort was U.S. policy
toward a country thousands of miles away. That figure was more than five
times what Bowman's own campaign spent, and it was decisive. Bowman lost
by seventeen points.20
The pattern crosses party lines. The same year, Representative Bob Good of
Virginia, the chair of the House Freedom Caucus, lost his Republican
primary to a state senator named John McGuire. McGuire ran with Donald
Trump's endorsement, which Trump had given after Good backed Ron DeSantis
in the presidential primary. He also drew support from outside groups
tied to former Speaker Kevin McCarthy, whom Good had voted to remove from
the speakership the previous year. Outside groups poured nearly $11
million into the race, one of the most expensive Republican House
primaries of the cycle. Good's own campaign raised $1.4 million; outside
spending against him reached $6.9 million. He lost by 370 votes.21
OpenSecrets and AdImpact reporting on 2024 House primaries. Bowman race outside spending figure represents United Democracy Project (AIPAC super PAC) spending alone.
Both races show the mechanism, but only one of them keeps going past the
primary. Good's defeat closed out an intra-party fight about who held the
speakership. Bowman's defeat was one move in a longer effort with a clear
policy direction, and that direction shows up in the votes Congress has
been taking.
Returning to AIPAC, its reach goes well beyond a single race. Across the
2024 election cycle, the organization deployed roughly $127 million
through its lobbying operation, its political action committee, and the
United Democracy Project.22 Organized money on this scale can even
produce policy outcomes that diverge from what voters say they want.
The gap between Democratic voters and Democratic representatives on Israel
policy is unusually concrete. In April 2024, the House passed the Israel
Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, sending roughly $17 billion in
additional military and security assistance to Israel as part of a $26
billion supplemental package. House Democrats backed it 173 to 37, with
more than four out of five voting in favor of its passage.23 Their
constituents were not with them. Polling around the same time found that
only about a third of Democrats viewed Israel favorably, just a quarter
supported continued U.S. military aid, and roughly three-quarters
disapproved of Israel's military actions in Gaza.24 In the same months
that Democratic representatives cast their votes and the people who
elected them spoke with pollsters, the two looked nothing alike.
The original principle was that every citizen has an equal political
voice, and so far we've been exploring the ways in which that notion has
been strained. So far the conversation has stayed with institutions:
lobbying firms, super PACs, the legal architecture that turns money into
influence. But voice is something people have, and nothing puts the
claim of equal voice to a fairer test than the individuals whose voices,
by any measure worth taking, now carry vastly more weight than those of
their fellow citizens.
In the 2024 federal election cycle, the top five individual contributors
to American politics were, in order: Elon Musk, who gave roughly $291
million; Timothy Mellon, who gave roughly $197 million; Miriam Adelson,
who gave roughly $148 million; Richard and Elizabeth Uihlein, who gave
roughly $143 million; and Kenneth Griffin, who gave roughly $108
million.25 All five directed their contributions toward Republican
candidates and causes. The cycle's total individual contribution from
these five people alone approached $900 million. Musk's $291 million was
nearly as much as Donald Trump's entire campaign committee raised from
all sources combined.26 Every donor, large and small, over the entire
two-year cycle.
OpenSecrets and FEC reporting on the 2024 election cycle. Musk's contributions went almost entirely to outside groups (super PACs); the campaign committee figure reflects funds raised by Trump's principal campaign committee.
It would be tempting to view that graphic as a story
about one party, one candidate, or one man, but the pattern is older and
broader than any single cycle. In the 2022 cycle, the largest individual
contributor in the country was George Soros, who gave roughly $178
million, almost entirely to Democratic candidates and causes, which was
more than the next two contributors combined.27 In the 2020 cycle,
four of the top ten individual contributors gave principally to Democrats,
including Michael Bloomberg at roughly $152 million and Tom Steyer at
roughly $72 million.28 The names and the partisan tilt change from
cycle to cycle, but the system does not. In every recent cycle, a small
number of individuals have provided a share of the country's political
spending that no ordinary citizen, regardless of party, could plausibly
match.
The 2024 cycle is worth dwelling on, because it produced something the
country has not previously seen. Elon Musk's $291 million was not only the
largest individual contribution of the cycle; it was, by available
reporting, the largest disclosed individual contribution in the history of
American federal elections.29 After the election, the candidate he
supported took office, and Musk was given a role with broad authority over
the federal workforce, authority that included reducing the headcount of
agencies, accessing internal government data systems, and shaping the
operations of departments whose work touched directly on his own
companies' regulatory environment.30
Consider one example. In late January 2025, Musk's social media platform
X announced a partnership with Visa to launch a digital wallet and
peer-to-peer payments service, the first step toward what Musk has
described as turning the platform into an "everything app" through which
users could conduct their "entire financial life."31 Within ten days,
Musk's team at the federal Department of Government Efficiency had
arrived at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the agency created
after the 2008 financial crisis to regulate consumer financial
products.32 Within weeks, the bureau's leadership had begun moves to
terminate nearly all 1,700 of its employees, its work was halted, and its
headquarters was closed.33 There is no precedent in American history
for a private citizen contributing at this scale to an election and then
assuming this kind of role inside the government that election produced.
But this has nothing to do with the particulars and everything to do with
the system that allows for it. Consider how this would read in a history
textbook written a century from now, describing a different era. Imagine
if the entry for the 1904 election noted that John D. Rockefeller, having
spent heavily to support the winning candidate, was subsequently given an
office inside the federal government with authority to dismiss civil
servants, access agency records, and oversee the operations of departments
that regulated the oil industry. Most Americans would find it strange, and
it would be strange regardless of what they thought of Rockefeller, the
president, or the policies the arrangement produced.
None of what has been discussed thus far is illegal. The Supreme Court
has, in fact, affirmed much of it.34 Some readers may agree with what
Elon Musk wants for the country, others with what George Soros wants. But
given the scale at which money now operates in our politics, it might be
time to ask whether the principle this country was founded on, that every
citizen has an equal political voice, still describes the country we live
in. That principle was written into the nation's founding, reaffirmed by
amendment after amendment, and stated again as constitutional doctrine.
The question is whether we practice it, or whether it is something we
have merely learned to tell ourselves.
Starbucks Corporation, "Starbucks Reports Q4 and Full Fiscal Year 2024 Results," October 30, 2024. Net income reported at $3.76 billion. (Starbucks's fiscal year 2024 ran October 2023 – September 2024; the federal lobbying figure is for calendar 2024.) ↩
Starbucks Corporation, "Starbucks Reports Q4 and Full Fiscal Year 2024 Results," October 30, 2024. Store count of 40,199 at fiscal year-end. ↩
Author's calculation based on average SNAP benefit of $187.20 per participant per month in fiscal year 2024 (USDA ERS). Florida population estimate (approximately 23 million) from U.S. Census Bureau, 2024. ers.usda.gov ↩
Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi, "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process," American Economic Review 104, no. 12 (December 2014): 3885–3920. ↩
Raquel Meyer Alexander, Stephen W. Mazza, and Susan Scholz, "Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations," Journal of Law and Politics 25, no. 4 (2009): 401–457. ↩
Burnett v. National Association of Realtors, W.D. Mo., No. 4:19-cv-00332, jury verdict October 31, 2023; settlement of $418 million granted final approval November 26, 2024. ↩
Brett Bachman, "Democrats Groan at AIPAC's $14.5 Million 'Overkill' Against Jamaal Bowman," Axios, June 26, 2024. The figure represents United Democracy Project spending alone, which the New York Times reported "eclipsed what any interest group has ever spent on a single House race." https://www.axios.com/2024/06/26/democrats-aipac-jamaal-bowman-george-latimer↩
Roll Call 152, H.R. 8034 (Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024), April 20, 2024. Final passage was 366 to 58, with 173 Democrats and 193 Republicans in support. https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2024152↩
See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). ↩
Segment 03
Principle #2. Representatives are chosen by voters
Democracy was invented in a place small enough to practice it in person.
The citizens of ancient Athens could assemble, hear the arguments, and vote
together on the questions that governed them. That mode of governance was
already considered unworkable by the Founders at the scale of a single
nation, and the problem has only intensified since. Hundreds of millions
of people scattered across a continent, deciding continuously on questions
that require sustained attention and technical expertise, cannot govern
themselves by assembly. Every modern democracy has solved this problem the
same way: representation. Citizens choose representatives, and those
representatives deliberate on what the laws should be.
This is the standard implementation of democracy at scale, as is the case
in Norway, Ireland, Japan, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and practically
every other functioning democracy. Parliamentary or presidential,
two-party or multi-party, federal or unitary, democracies often vary
widely in their architecture, but what they share is representation. There
is no functioning modern democracy in which the people themselves, rather
than their representatives, do the legislating, because no such system has
ever been made to work above the scale of a township.
America's version of representation was designed with this scale problem
in mind. The Constitution created two chambers with different logics: the
House of Representatives, popularly elected every two years with seats
apportioned by population, and the Senate, with equal representation per
state and members originally chosen by state legislatures rather than
voters. The same amendments that progressively expanded who could vote,
the 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th, also widened, by definition, the circle of
who got to choose. In 1913, the 17th Amendment went further, taking the
selection of senators away from state legislatures and giving it directly
to voters. The arc of American democratic development has been a long,
contested movement toward putting the choosing in the hands of "the
People."
If representation is the only viable form of democracy at scale, and if
America has spent its history working to make the choice belong genuinely
to "the People," then the way representatives are chosen matters as much
as the principle of equal voice itself. So, how are representatives chosen?
Primarily A Secondary Issue
The way Americans choose their representatives today is not the way they
always have. For most of the nineteenth century, candidates for office
were selected by party leaders in conventions and caucuses. A small number
of insiders decided who would appear on the ballot, and voters decided
between the two names the parties had handed them. By the late 1800s,
this had become a target of reform. The Progressive Era's leading figures,
such as Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, argued that candidate selection
should not be left to party bosses but given directly to voters.1 The
remedy was the direct primary. La Follette pushed it through the Wisconsin
legislature in 1903, where voters ratified it the following year; by 1917
all but four states had adopted some form of it.2 The reform was sold as more democracy, not
less. Its purpose was to take power from a small group of party insiders
and put it in the hands of the people.
A century later, it is worth asking how that worked out.
The most basic measure of whether voters control candidate selection is
whether voters show up. In American primaries, they generally do not.
Across the past quarter-century, primary turnout has hovered between
roughly fourteen and thirty percent of eligible voters, with the lowest
figures concentrated in midterm years.3 In 2014, fewer than fifteen
percent of eligible Americans cast a primary ballot. In 2022, the figure
was about twenty percent.4 General-election turnout swings with the
calendar, climbing past sixty percent in presidential years and falling
closer to forty in midterms, but even the worst-attended general election
in this period drew more than twice the share of eligible voters as the
average primary. The general election that follows then ratifies a choice
that a much smaller electorate already made.
States United Democracy Center, voter turnout data 2000–2024; voting-eligible population estimates from the UF Election Lab. Even-numbered federal election years; national aggregate computed as total ballots cast divided by total VEP across all states.
The state-level picture can be even more grim. Consider New Jersey, where
most congressional districts have leaned reliably toward one party for
most of this period, which means the primary in the dominant party is
usually the election that decides who serves.5 Primary turnout in New
Jersey was 6.9 percent of eligible voters in 2014, 8.2 percent in 2010,
and 7.1 percent in 2006.6 Across every midterm cycle of the past
quarter-century, fewer than one in eight eligible New Jerseyans cast a
primary ballot, and in five of those cycles it was fewer than one in ten.
The general elections that followed drew far higher participation, in line
with the national average, but in the safe districts that make up most of
the state's congressional map, the names on the November ballot had
already been chosen by an electorate of fewer than one in ten eligible
voters.
Behind the turnout numbers is a simpler fact. In most congressional
districts, the general election is a formality. The way district lines
are drawn, combined with where voters of each party live, means the
outcome of the great majority of House races is predictable long before
November. In 2024, the Cook Political Report rated only 22 of 435 House
races as toss-ups in its final pre-election ratings. The vast majority of
the other 413 were rated likely or solid for one party, and the dominant
party's candidate in each was already on track to win.7
If the general election is a formality, the primary is the consequential
election, because that is where the dominant party's nominee is chosen.
In 2024, about 18 million voters cast primary ballots that decided the
occupants of 380 House seats. That is roughly seven percent of voting-age
Americans choosing eighty-seven percent of the House. In 169 of those
districts, the dominant-party nominee faced no primary opponent and
secured a seat in Congress without earning a single vote. The general
election that followed ratified outcomes that had been settled months
earlier, and in nearly two-fifths of House seats, by no voter at all.8
One response is that if primaries decide outcomes, more people should
vote in them. But for millions of Americans, the question of whether to
vote in a primary is not theirs to answer. The rules of who counts as a
primary voter exclude them by design.
In most states, primaries are open or partially open, meaning any
registered voter, or any voter not registered with the opposing party,
can participate. However, in fifteen states, the primary is closed,
meaning only voters who have registered with a party in advance can cast
a ballot in that party's primary. New York, Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Maryland are among those fifteen.9 In those states, voters who have
declined to register with either major party are formally excluded from
the only election that, in safe districts, decides who represents them.
Roughly 17.6 million registered voters are in that situation, and the
share of voters not registered with either major party has grown by about
twenty percent in the past fifteen years.10 According to Gallup,
forty-three percent of American adults now identify as political
independents, compared to twenty-eight percent each for Democrats and
Republicans.11 The group most reliably excluded from primaries is also,
by a substantial margin, the largest political group in the country.
Gallup 2024 party identification (n=14,162); Unite America Institute, closed-primary state registration data. Bars sum to 99 percent; the remaining 1 percent reported as “other” or no opinion.
The closed-primary problem is part of a larger one. Even where
independents can vote in primaries, a registered Republican in a safely
Democratic district has no meaningful vote in the election that decides
who represents them. They can vote in the Republican primary, but it
selects a candidate who will lose the general by a wide margin. They can
vote in November, but the outcome was settled before the campaign began.
The same is true in reverse for a Democrat in a safely Republican
district.
So the question of who has a meaningful vote does not really come down to
turnout, closed primaries, or who shows up to a primary. It comes down to
how many districts are safe in the first place. If most districts were
genuinely competitive, every voter in November would have something at
stake. The fact that they are not is what gives the small primary
electorate its outsized power, which raises the question of how the
districts came to be that way.
Gerry Meandering Around Town
In March 1812, the governor of Massachusetts signed a bill redrawing the
boundaries of the state's senate districts. The map had been engineered
by his party, the Democratic-Republicans, to disadvantage the rival
Federalists in the upcoming election. One of the resulting districts, in
the area north of Boston, was so contorted that it ran for nearly a
hundred miles in a thin curve along the coast. A cartoonist for the
Boston Gazette drew the district as a winged dragon, and the editor
coined a new word by combining the governor's name with "salamander." The
governor was Elbridge Gerry, and the practice has been called
gerrymandering ever since.12
Composition of the Essex South senatorial district, Massachusetts, 1812. Town arrangement is approximate and schematic, not drawn to geographic scale. The district was the subject of the Boston Gazette's “Gerry-mander” cartoon, published March 26, 1812.
Gerry was a serious figure. He had signed the Declaration of Independence,
served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and would later be
elected vice president under James Madison. By contemporary accounts he
disliked the redistricting bill and signed it reluctantly. He lost his
reelection that fall.13 The map he had signed survived him, and so did
the word. Two centuries later, the practice it named has become more
sophisticated, more deliberate, and considerably more effective than
anything Gerry's mapmakers could have managed with a pen and paper. But
the basic idea is the same. The party in power draws the lines so that
its own voters are distributed efficiently across many districts and the
opposing party's voters are concentrated into a few. The result is a
legislature whose composition reflects the cartography as much as the
votes.
The most candid descriptions of gerrymandering come from the people who
do it. In 2000, Thomas Hofeller, the Republican strategist who would go
on to design many of the most aggressively partisan congressional maps of
the next two decades, described his trade to a conference of state
legislators. "Redistricting is like an election in reverse," he said.
"It's a great event. Usually the voters get to pick the politicians. In
redistricting, the politicians get to pick the voters."14 Sixteen years
later, in 2016, Republican state representative David Lewis defended a
North Carolina congressional map he had helped draw with similar candor
on the floor of the General Assembly. "I think electing Republicans is
better than electing Democrats," he said. "So I drew this map to help
foster what I think is better for the country." He went on to say that he
had proposed a ten-to-three Republican advantage only because he did not
believe it was possible to draw a map with eleven Republicans and two
Democrats.15 North Carolina that year was a state where Republican
congressional candidates would win 53 percent of the statewide vote, and
Democratic candidates 47 percent. The map produced ten Republican seats
and three Democratic ones, exactly as Lewis had said it was designed to
do.16
The pattern is bipartisan. In a 2017 deposition, former Maryland Governor
Martin O'Malley, a Democrat, was asked under oath about the congressional
map he had overseen in 2011, which had transformed a six-to-two
Democratic delegation into a seven-to-one one. "I did everything in my
power to draw a map that would be more favorable to the election of a
Democratic congressional delegation," he said. Asked whether the redrawn
district had been intended to elect a Democrat rather than a Republican,
he replied, "Yes, this was clearly my intent."17 What gets called fair
maps in public is described, in private rooms and sworn testimony, as
something else.
The principle at stake is that voters choose their representatives. A
congressional district is the unit through which that choice is made: a
defined geographic area whose residents share enough common ground that
one person can credibly speak for them in Washington. A district should
outline a cohesive area representing a cohesive group of people with
shared concerns a single representative could meaningfully address.
Gerrymandering inverts this. Instead of drawing districts that fit
communities, the lines are drawn to fit electoral outcomes. The
illustration below shows how. Imagine a state of fifty voters, sixty
percent of whom support one party and forty percent the other, divided
into five equal districts that will each elect one representative. Three
different ways of drawing the lines produce varied outcomes. In the first,
the lines roughly track where voters live, and the resulting delegation
reflects the population, three to two in favor of the majority. In the
second, the lines are drawn so that every district contains a slim
majority of the larger group, and the larger party wins every seat. In
the third, the lines bend and twist so that the smaller party wins three
districts out of five, despite being a minority of the total population.
Same voters, same votes, three different governments. The lines decide.
And in most American states, the people drawing the lines are the
legislators themselves, which means the people whose jobs depend on the
outcome of the next election are the ones deciding which voters they
will face.
Adapted from Stephen Nass, “How to Steal an Election: Gerrymandering” (Wikimedia Commons, 2015), public domain.
Having seen what gerrymandering can accomplish, the question is how often
it actually happens in the United States. After the 2020 census, of the
435 congressional districts in the country, 177 were drawn by
Republican-controlled state legislatures and roughly 50 by
Democratic-controlled ones. Another 28 were drawn by political
commissions, 82 by independent or advisory commissions, around 50 by
courts after legislative deadlocks or successful gerrymandering
challenges, and the remaining 48 by bipartisan compromise or in
single-seat states with no district lines to draw at all.18 In other
words, roughly half of the country's congressional districts were drawn
by the legislators of one party, sitting in a state capitol, deciding
which voters they would face in the next election.
Brennan Center for Justice, “Who Controlled Redistricting in Every State,” 2022. Reflects the post-2020-census cycle. “Other” includes states with bipartisan compromise (Maine) and single-seat at-large states.
The dynamic this produces is most visible in real time. The events
described below were still developing as this was written, and some of
the maps will have been changed, challenged, or reinstated by the time
it is read.19
In the summer of 2025, President Donald Trump asked the Republican-
controlled Texas legislature to redraw the state's congressional map
mid-decade in order to add Republican seats before the 2026 midterms.
Texas did so in July, in a special legislative session, producing a map
projected to flip up to five Democratic-held seats to Republicans.20
In the weeks that followed, Trump described the effort plainly. "We have
an opportunity in Texas to pick up five seats," he told CNBC in early
August. "I got the highest vote in the history of Texas, as you probably
know. And we are entitled to five more seats."21 Within weeks,
Republican legislatures in Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Utah
followed, each drawing new maps targeting Democratic seats in their
states.22
California's Democratic governor, Gavin Newsom, responded by placing
Proposition 50 on the November ballot, asking voters to suspend the
state's independent redistricting commission for one cycle and adopt a
new Democratic-drawn congressional map. The official title voters saw on
the ballot was unusually direct. "Authorizes temporary changes to
congressional district maps in response to Texas' partisan
redistricting."23 California voters approved it, and the new map was
projected to flip up to five Republican-held seats to Democrats.24
Virginia's Democratic-led legislature began a similar process. Florida
and Indiana Republicans considered the same. Within six months, six
states had adopted new mid-decade maps drawn for partisan advantage,
more than at any point since the 1960s.25
What was most striking was not that any individual map was unusually
contorted by historical standards. It was that the maps were drawn
outside the normal redistricting calendar, in direct response to a
political moment, and entirely without the participation of voters in
the affected districts. Voters in Texas, Missouri, North Carolina, and
California found themselves in different districts than they had been
in months earlier, and would vote in 2026 under maps they had no part
in choosing.
The practice of letting elected legislators draw their own districts is
not a feature of representative democracy itself. It is a feature of
American democracy specifically. In late 2025, in the middle of the
mid-decade redistricting wave, the Pew Research Center analyzed how 107
democracies around the world elect their national legislatures. The
researchers found that exactly one other country gives the job of
drawing legislative districts to subnational legislatures the way the
United States does. That country is the Federated States of Micronesia,
a Pacific nation of roughly 100,000 people.26
The other 105 democracies in the study, including the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, Germany, France, Japan, and every other wealthy
democracy the United States is usually compared to, draw their
legislative districts through national election agencies, independent
boundary commissions, or other bodies whose members are not the
legislators whose seats are being drawn. The American arrangement is not
how representative democracy works in the world. It is how it works
here. The problem the United States has spent two centuries discussing
is one that every comparable democracy has solved.
When the Supreme Court ruled in Rucho v. Common Cause in 2019 that
federal courts could not police partisan gerrymandering, Justice Elena
Kagan read her dissent aloud from the bench, a step justices reserve for
decisions they find catastrophically wrong. "If there is a single idea
that made our Nation," she wrote, "it is this one: The people are
sovereign…. The people get to choose their representatives. And then
they get to decide, at regular intervals, whether to keep them….
Election day…is what links the people to their representatives, and
gives the people their sovereign power. That day is the foundation of
democratic governance. And partisan gerrymandering can make it
meaningless."27
The principle this section opened with was that representatives are
chosen by voters. When the people choosing the voters are the people
running in the districts they drew, the principle is a farce.
Footnotes
On La Follette's role in the direct-primary movement, see Robert M. La Follette, La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences (Madison: The Robert M. La Follette Co., 1913); and Nancy C. Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). ↩
Wisconsin enacted the first statewide direct-primary law in 1903 (effective 1905). By 1917, all but four states had adopted some form of direct primary. See Alan Ware, The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–3. ↩
Joshua Ferrer and Michael Thorning, 2022 Primary Turnout: Trends and Lessons for Boosting Participation, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2023, finding 21.3 percent eligible-voter turnout in 2022 primaries; 14.3 percent in 2014. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/2022-primary-turnout/↩
This section was drafted in May 2026. The mid-decade redistricting effort that began in July 2025 was ongoing at the time of writing. ↩
Acacia Coronado and Nadia Lathan, "Texas Republicans Pass Trump-Backed Congressional Map," Associated Press, August 23, 2025. ↩
Donald Trump, interview on CNBC's Squawk Box, August 5, 2025, as reported in Russell Lewis, "Trump Says GOP Is 'Entitled' to Five More Texas Seats Amid Redistricting Push," Axios, August 5, 2025. https://www.axios.com/2025/08/05/trump-texas-five-seats-entitled↩
David A. Lieb, "Missouri Governor Signs Trump-Backed Plan," Associated Press, September 28, 2025. On North Carolina, see Travis Fain, "NC Republicans Pass New Congressional Districts Into Law," WRAL News, October 22, 2025. ↩
Principle #3. Representatives are beholden to their constituents
A senator and a representative both hold seats they were given on the
condition of acting on behalf of the people that put them there. The
Constitution made the House popularly elected from the start, and the
17th Amendment did the same for the Senate in 1913, replacing selection
by state legislatures with selection by voters. Madison's case for the
design, made in Federalist 57, was that the aim of every constitution
is "first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern,
and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust." The precautions
he named were short terms in the House, regular elections, and the
prospect of going back to live under the laws one had a hand in writing.
This is the third premise of the American system. Voters choose members
of Congress, and those members answer to the voters who chose them.
Edmund Burke, in his 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol, made the
case for a softer version of the principle. A representative owes his
constituents his judgment, not his obedience, Burke argued. The Burkean
trustee is still answerable to those he serves, but he is allowed to
disagree with them on the way to serving them well.
Members of Congress vote against the wishes of their districts and states
often enough that Burke's tradition gets cited in their defense. Take
that defense at face value and the question becomes whose interests they
are voting for instead. Four constituencies have a plausible claim today.
Donors and organized interests pay for the campaigns. Primary voters
decide whether the next nomination happens. Personal investment
portfolios sit on the other side of the legislation members vote on. And
after the seat is given up, an industry the member used to regulate is
often waiting with a job. Each is worth taking seriously on its own.
Out of Stock
In 2011, the journalist Peter Schweizer published Throw Them All Out, a
book documenting how members of Congress had been buying and selling
stocks in industries their committees regulated. The underlying academic
research found that senators' purchases beat the market by roughly twelve
percentage points a year, and House members' by about six.1 CBS News
followed in November of that year with a 60 Minutes segment on the same
practice, naming specific trades by specific members.2
Until then, members of Congress had not been clearly subject to insider
trading law. Their access to nonpublic information through committee
briefings and pending legislation was not treated as the kind of
fiduciary relationship that triggered Section 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act, and a bill to clarify that it should be, first introduced
in 2006, had been reintroduced and stalled three times.
After the 60 Minutes segment aired, that bill picked up 84 House
co-sponsors in five days. President Obama called for its passage in his
2012 State of the Union. It was signed into law in April of that year as
the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, or STOCK Act.3
The STOCK Act did two things. It made explicit that members of Congress
and their staff are subject to federal insider trading laws when they
trade on nonpublic information acquired through their official duties,
and it required disclosure of any individual trade above $1,000 within
45 days of execution. It did not ban members from owning or trading
individual stocks. An amendment passed quietly in 2013 removed the
requirement that disclosures be machine-readable in a searchable,
sortable, downloadable database, the form in which they had been most
useful to journalists and the public. What remained was the disclosure
regime as it now exists. Members file periodic transaction reports
listing the asset, the date, and a wide value bracket like "$1,001 to
$15,000" or "$500,001 to $1,000,000." Late filings carry a $200
fine.4
Because the passage of the STOCK Act didn't prohibit trading, it
continued. In February 2020, Senator Richard Burr, then chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, sold between $628,000 and $1.7 million in
stocks across 33 transactions on February 13. He had been receiving
classified briefings on the coronavirus in his capacity as committee
chair in late January and early February. A week after his sale, the
Dow began a slide that wiped out roughly 30 percent of its value over the
following month.5
The FBI seized Burr's phone, the SEC opened a parallel investigation, and
the Justice Department closed the criminal case in January 2021 without
filing charges. A 2020 affidavit from the FBI investigation, unsealed in
2022, estimated that Burr's February trades had produced more than
$164,000 in profits and avoided $87,000 in losses. He served out his
term and retired from the Senate in January 2023.6
Burr's case is the most documented but it is not unusual. Each year since
the financial-tracking firm Unusual Whales began publishing annual
analyses of congressional trading, dozens of members have outperformed
the benchmark S&P 500.7 To make the comparison concrete, imagine
three Americans putting $10,000 into the market at the start of 2021.
The first follows the S&P 500. The second mirrors the aggregate trades
of Republican members of Congress. The third does the same for Democrats.
Unusual Whales annual Congressional Trading Reports (2022–2026); S&P 500 total return. Congressional aggregates compound the reported average portfolio returns of Democratic and Republican members of Congress, computed from Periodic Transaction Reports filed under the STOCK Act.
Across the five years, Democrats and Republicans alike outperformed the
market. Although the three moved roughly together in the first year, the
gap opens in 2022, when the S&P fell roughly 18 percent and the average
American with money in the market lost a fifth of it, while Congress, on
the whole, finished the year roughly where it had started. From there it
compounds. The Republican aggregate beat the index by about eighteen
percent, and the Democratic aggregate beat it by thirty-two percent.
A defender of the practice might point to what Speaker Pelosi said in
2021, when she was asked whether members of Congress should be allowed
to trade individual stocks. "We're a free-market economy," she replied.
"They should be able to participate in that."8 Some members of
Congress may be good investors; some may even have been lucky. The gap
is not, on its own, evidence of anything illegal. The pattern that
breaks the defense is what they are trading.
In September 2022, the New York Times published an investigation that
mapped three years of congressional trades against committee assignments.
The reporters, drawing on Periodic Transaction Reports filed under the
STOCK Act, identified 97 members of Congress whose trades intersected
with the work of the committees they served on. The investigation
covered more than 3,700 such trades and split almost evenly along party
lines, with 49 Democrats and 44 Republicans.9
A third of the members of the House Environment subcommittee traded
oil-field services stocks. A quarter of the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee bought or sold ExxonMobil or Chevron. Eight members
of the Armed Services Committee traded defense or aerospace stocks while
they were writing the budgets that determined how much those companies
would earn from federal contracts. Representative Bob Gibbs, an Ohio
Republican on the House Oversight Committee, bought shares of the
pharmaceutical company AbbVie in 2020 and 2021, while his committee was
investigating AbbVie and five rivals over high drug prices. The wife of
Representative Alan Lowenthal sold Boeing shares one day before a
committee on which he sat released damaging findings on Boeing's
handling of its 737 Max jet. In 2025, Representative Marjorie Taylor
Greene purchased up to $300,000 in stocks hours before President Trump
announced a pause on tariffs against most U.S. trading partners.
The markets soared on the announcement.10
New York Times analysis (Kate Kelly, Adam Playford, and Alicia Parlapiano, September 13, 2022), drawing on Periodic Transaction Reports filed under the STOCK Act. The investigation identified 97 members of Congress whose trades intersected with their committee work, including 49 Democrats and 44 Republicans, across more than 3,700 individual trades over the three-year period.
Whether any individual trade was legal is the wrong question. The trade
may be legal. The information may be public. The vote may be consistent
with the member's stated position. Whether the member is voting on
behalf of constituents or on behalf of a portfolio is a question the
system asks the member to answer for themselves, and is content with
whichever answer they provide.
A 2025 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, conducted by researchers at the Rady School of Management at
UC San Diego, ran a controlled experiment in which Americans were shown
nonpartisan reports on congressional trading and then asked about their
views of Congress. Participants who saw the trading data were
significantly more likely to describe Congress as corrupt and less
legitimate, and significantly less willing to comply with the laws
Congress passed. The effect held across party lines. As Tage Rai, a
co-author, put it, what damages public trust is not whether the trades
are profitable or even illegal. It is the perception that lawmakers are
using their power for personal gain. Even the attempt is enough.11
Friends With Benefits
Campaign donors have a different kind of claim on a member of Congress
than stocks do. Campaigns cost money, and the money has to come from
somewhere. The pattern worth examining is what happens when a member's
stated reason for a position is technically defensible but the underlying
driver is a long-running financial relationship with the interests on the
other side of the legislation.
Carried interest is one such seam. It is a provision in the tax code
that lets private equity executives and hedge fund managers pay capital
gains rates on their fee income, rather than the higher ordinary income
rates that apply to wage earners. Three consecutive presidents, Barack
Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden, have called for its closure. It has
survived all of them.12
In 2017, as Congress wrote the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the largest
rewrite of the tax code in three decades, the carried-interest loophole
was on the table. Trump had campaigned on closing it, calling hedge fund
managers "getting away with murder."13 Gary Cohn, the chair of his
National Economic Council, said publicly that the White House tried
twenty-five times to get the provision removed and Congress refused.14
What Congress did instead was extend the holding period required for
carried interest to qualify for capital gains treatment from one year to
three years, a change that did not affect most private equity firms
because they typically hold investments longer than three years
anyway.15
The architect of the Senate's tax legislation was Mitch McConnell, then
Senate Majority Leader. In 2014, Blackstone, the world's largest private
equity firm, had spent $217,000 to help re-elect him. By the end of
2017, Blackstone employees had given another $212,000.16 Across
Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR combined, private equity money to GOP
lawmakers in 2017 alone reached $1.31 million, more than three times
what those same firms gave Democrats.17
OpenSecrets. Each bar represents the six-year campaign finance reporting period ending in the labeled election year.
In 2022, the carried-interest provision came up again, this time inside
the Inflation Reduction Act. The proposed change would have closed it
for an estimated $14 billion in revenue over a decade, money earmarked
for climate and health spending.18 Kyrsten Sinema, the freshman
Democrat from Arizona whose vote was decisive in the evenly divided
Senate, refused to support the bill unless the carried-interest
provision was removed. So, it was removed.19
Between 2018 and the August 2022 vote, Sinema received more than $2
million from the securities and investment industry, outraising the
Senate Banking Committee's Democratic chair over the same period.20 In the months leading
up to the vote, executives across the private equity industry
contributed more than $500,000 to her campaign.21 After the bill
passed without the carried-interest provision, Lloyd Blankfein, the
former chief executive of Goldman Sachs, posted on Twitter, "Hats off to
the P/E lobby!"22
OpenSecrets. Each bar represents the six-year campaign finance reporting period ending in the labeled election year. Sinema served in the House from 2013 to 2019 and the Senate from 2019 to 2025.
The two outcomes were produced by different people, in different
parties, in different years, but the structure of what happened was
identical. A tax preference that three presidents had called for
closing, that polled poorly across the political spectrum, that no
constituency outside the industry's executive ranks defended on its
merits, was kept in the tax code because the people writing the
legislation were responsive to the people who funded their campaigns.
Neither Kentucky nor Arizona is home to a meaningful private equity
industry; both senators were defending an interest that had almost no
presence among the people they were elected to represent.
OpenSecrets. Each bar represents the six-year campaign finance reporting period ending in the labeled election year.
Representatives are supposed to answer to the people they represent.
What McConnell and Sinema showed is that they often answer to their
donors instead. Donors aren't the only people a member of Congress has
to keep happy. There's a second group with the power to end their
career, and most of their actual voters aren't part of it.
Job Security
The most reliable predictor of whether a member of Congress will be in
office next year is whether they are in office this year. House
incumbents seeking reelection have won at rates above eighty-five percent
in every cycle for sixty years and above ninety percent on average for
the past decade.23 In 2022, every single one of the twenty-eight
senators who sought reelection won, the first time that had happened in
the history of the chamber.24 These are not the numbers of a
workforce facing meaningful evaluation. In fact, they are the numbers of
a workforce that has been substantially insulated from it.
The insulation has several layers. The first is geographic. After the
redistricting work described earlier, most congressional districts are
no longer competitive. The Cook Political Report rates only nine percent
of House seats as competitive in 2026, meaning roughly nine in ten are
decided before any voter casts a ballot in November.25 The Senate is
somewhat more contested by design, since statewide constituencies cannot
be drawn around partisan lines the way House districts can, but the
picture is broadly similar. Of the thirty-five Senate seats on the 2026
ballot, the Cook Political Report rates six as competitive.26
Cook Political Report 2026 House and Senate ratings as of April 2026; FairVote, “Monopoly Politics 2026.” Competitive seats are those rated toss-up or lean by Cook.
The second layer is financial. Incumbents raise money on a different
scale than the people running against them. In the 2022 cycle, the
average House incumbent raised $2.8 million; the average challenger
raised $308,000. The average Senate incumbent raised $29.7 million; the
average Senate challenger raised $2.1 million.27 Political action
committees concentrate their giving with a discipline that reflects the
underlying math. In 2022, eighty-six percent of all PAC contributions to
congressional candidates went to incumbents.28 Donors are paying
attention to the same reelection statistics everyone else is, and they
are placing their bets accordingly.
OpenSecrets, “Incumbent politicians enjoy record reelection in an aging Congress,” October 2023. Figures are averages across major-party general-election candidates for the 2022 cycle.
The third layer is the voters themselves. Americans used to split their
tickets at meaningful rates. They would vote for one party for president
and another for Congress, or pick a familiar incumbent regardless of
national mood. That pattern has largely disappeared. Both parties have
moved away from the political center since the 1970s, and the voters
who turn out for each have sorted along with them. In the 2024 election,
only sixteen of the 435 House districts split their ticket, voting for
one party for president and the other for House.29 When voters
consistently pick the same party up and down the ballot, the partisan
lean of a district becomes the dominant predictor of the outcome. A
district that leans Republican by ten points used to be competitive in a
strong Democratic year. Today it is not.
Pew Research Center analysis of presidential and House election results, 1972–2012; UVA Center for Politics, Daily Kos Elections, and Split-Ticket for 2016, 2020, and 2024.
The same sorting has happened inside Congress. Political scientists track
this with a measure called overlap, which counts the share of House
members whose voting record places them between the two parties. A
Republican is in the overlap zone if their voting pattern is more liberal
than the most conservative Democrat. A Democrat is in the zone if their
voting pattern is more conservative than the most liberal Republican. In
other words, overlap measures whether there is anyone in the chamber
whose votes give the other side a natural partner. In the early 1970s,
more than half the House sat in that zone.30 By the mid-1980s, after
a collapse, it was around one in ten. By the mid-1990s it was under one
percent. Since 2003, when the last two Republicans whose voting records
crossed into Democratic territory left office, the overlap has been
zero.31
Voteview, House Polarization data (Poole and Rosenthal), via legacy.voteview.com, for 1971–2013. Pew Research Center analysis of DW-NOMINATE data for 2015–2023.
The fourth layer is the one that matters most for the principle at hand.
When a seat is safe in November because of the district lines, the money
advantage, and the voters' own party loyalty, the only voters who can
plausibly end a member's career are the ones who show up for the
primary. A general election in a congressional district draws
Republicans, Democrats, and independents. A primary draws only the
voters of one party. That smaller group sits further from the political
center than the district as a whole, and the candidates it favors do
too. An incumbent in a safe district who answers to the primary voters
is answering to a group of constituents further from the center than the
district they were elected to represent. And they have no electoral
reason to answer to anyone else.
The principle being tested here is that representatives are beholden to
their constituents. The reality is that representatives are beholden to
a much smaller and more partisan subset of their constituents, and only
when those constituents are sufficiently aroused to vote in a primary.
The other constituents, the ones whose preferences sit closer to the
district's center, are an afterthought by the time November arrives.
Exit Interview
When a member of Congress leaves office, the most likely next job is one
that lobbies the colleagues they left behind. This was not always true,
and it is not how things work in comparable democracies. It is, however,
how things work in Washington, and it produces a kind of representation
problem the earlier sections did not address. While in office, a member
is the target of lobbying. After office, they often become the lobbyist.
Billy Tauzin spent nearly twenty-five years in the House, the last several as
chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, which oversees the
pharmaceutical industry.32 In 2003 he was the chief architect of the
Medicare Prescription Drug Bill, the legislation that created Medicare
Part D.33 The bill prohibited the federal government from negotiating
drug prices and barred the reimportation of cheaper drugs from
abroad.34 Both provisions were worth billions of dollars a year to
pharmaceutical companies. Tauzin announced his retirement from Congress
shortly after the bill passed. The day after his term ended in January
2005, he began work as president and CEO of PhRMA, the pharmaceutical
industry's lobbying arm, at a reported salary of roughly $2 million a
year. By 2010 he was earning $11.6 million.35
Tauzin maintained then and since that there was no connection between
the bill and the job, and he broke no laws.36 The point of the story
is that the member who chaired the committee that wrote the most
consequential pharmaceutical legislation in a generation moved directly
from writing it to representing the companies that benefited from it.
When he was writing the legislation, was he representing the interests
of his constituents in Louisiana, or the interests of the pharmaceutical
industry?
Dick Gephardt's case shows the same pattern across a different kind of
issue. Gephardt served in the House for twenty-eight years, fourteen of
them as Democratic Leader.37 While in Congress he was a public
supporter of recognizing the Armenian genocide, the systematic killing
of more than a million Armenians by the Ottoman government beginning in
1915. In 2000 he wrote to Speaker Dennis Hastert urging immediate floor
consideration of the recognition resolution, stating that "this issue
requires little if any additional deliberation by the House."38 He
left Congress in 2005 and founded a lobbying firm.39 In 2007 the
firm signed a contract with the government of Turkey worth $1.2 million
a year.40
Turkey's central foreign-policy priority in Washington was, and remains,
defeating the same Armenian Genocide recognition resolution Gephardt had
championed. According to filings under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act and reporting in the Washington Post and New Republic, Gephardt's
firm arranged meetings between Turkish officials and House Democratic
leaders, helped the Turkish ambassador secure an audience with Speaker
Pelosi, and circulated a booklet denying that what happened in 1915 was
a genocide.41 Gephardt did nothing illegal. He simply represented
one set of constituents while in office and a different one after.
When we zoom out, we find that these aren't rare occurrences. Public
Citizen found that nearly two-thirds of former members of the 115th
Congress who entered the private sector took jobs designed to influence
federal policy.42 An academic study tracking House and Senate
members from 1976 to 2012 found that the share of departing members
becoming registered lobbyists rose steadily over the period, and that
the members most likely to make the jump were committee chairs and
members of the most powerful committees.43
Lazarus, McKay, and Herbel, “Who Walks Through the Revolving Door?” Interest Groups & Advocacy 5 (2016), Figure 1b.
On the executive branch side, a 2023 Senate report found 672 former
government officials, military officers, and members of Congress working
as lobbyists, board members, or executives for the top twenty federal
defense contractors in 2022.44 The largest hirers were Boeing,
Pfizer, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin. Pfizer's place
on the list reflects the wave of federal contracting tied to
pandemic-era vaccine procurement, but the other four are the same names
that dominate every other measure of the defense industry.45 These
are the most regulated industries in the country, and the people who
used to write the rules now work for the regulated.
Office of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, “Pentagon Alchemy: How Defense Officials Pass Through the Revolving Door and Peddle Brass for Gold” (April 2023). Across the top 20 contractors, 91 percent of these hires worked as registered lobbyists.
What makes this a representation problem rather than a corruption
problem is that it does not require any individual member to be acting
in bad faith. A member of Energy and Commerce in 2025, weighing a vote
on drug pricing, knows what Tauzin's path looks like and knows what kind
of record keeps it open. A member of Armed Services knows that the board
seats and executive positions exist, that they pay well, and that they
are not offered to people who spent their committee years making the
contractors' lives difficult. None of this needs to be conscious to do
its work. The future employer is a presence in the room while the
current vote is being cast, and the constituent who will never offer a
board seat or a managing director title is not.
Stocks, donors, primary voters, and future employers are four different
audiences a member of Congress can be representing at any given moment.
None of them is the median voter in the district they were elected from.
The principle this section opened with was that representatives are
beholden to their constituents. The reality is that they are beholden to
whoever will most plausibly end or extend their career, and the people
who can do that are mostly not the people who voted for them.
Footnotes
Peter Schweizer, Throw Them All Out: How Politicians and Their Friends Get Rich Off Insider Stock Tips, Land Deals, and Cronyism That Would Send the Rest of Us to Prison (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011). Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39, no. 4 (December 2004): 661–676 (Senate findings); Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives," Business and Politics 13, no. 4 (2011) (House findings). ↩
Steve Kroft, "Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?," 60 Minutes, CBS News, November 13, 2011. ↩
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, Public Law 112-105, was signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 4, 2012. Office of Government Ethics STOCK Act materials at https://www.oge.gov↩
Same source. On the Marjorie Taylor Greene tariff trade, see Brian Schwartz, "Marjorie Taylor Greene Disclosed Stock Purchases on the Same Day Trump Paused Tariffs," CNBC, April 10, 2025. Clerk of the House Financial Disclosure database at https://disclosures-clerk.house.gov↩
"Wilbert Joseph (Billy) Tauzin," History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives. Tauzin served from May 22, 1980 to January 3, 2005. https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/22705↩
Public Citizen, "Nearly Two Thirds of Former Members of 115th Congress Working Outside Politics and Government Have Picked Up Lobbying or Strategic Consulting Jobs," May 30, 2019. https://www.citizen.org/article/revolving-congress/↩
Jeffrey Lazarus, Amy McKay, and Lindsey Herbel, "Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress," Interest Groups & Advocacy 5, no. 1 (2016): 82–100. https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2015.16↩
What most Americans, across both parties, want done.
Segment 05
Where we want to be
A country in which citizens do not have an equal political voice, in which
voters do not choose their representatives, and in which representatives
are not beholden to the people who elected them is not, in the meaningful
sense of the word, a democracy. Elections still happen. The Constitution
has not been suspended. But the word describes a relationship between a
people and their government that does not exist.
If this was where the paper ended, it would be a fairly bleak conclusion.
Americans are already keenly aware of these issues and the problems that
follow from leaving them unsolved. They have been telling pollsters for
half a century that big donors have too much influence, that lobbyists
sway politicians, that constituents have too little say, that members of
Congress should not be trading stocks in industries they regulate, that
districts should not be drawn by the people running in them. Where
Americans disagree—abortion, immigration, tax policy—the gaps are vast,
but every issue covered in this paper is one where an overwhelming
percentage of Americans find agreement.
In 1857, Frederick Douglass gave a speech in Canandaigua, New York, on
the anniversary of the British emancipation of slaves in the West Indies.
"Power concedes nothing without a demand," he told the crowd. "It never
did and it never will."1 Douglass was speaking about American
slavery, but the point holds wherever a public wants something its
government has not given it. The pages that follow take seven of these
issues one at a time, with the reform most Americans support in each case.
Footnotes
Frederick Douglass, "The Significance of Emancipation in the West Indies," address delivered at Canandaigua, New York, August 3, 1857. Add: Published in Two Speeches, By Frederick Douglass (Rochester, N.Y.: C.P. Dewey, 1857). Full text at https://frederickdouglasspapersproject.com/s/digitaledition/item/10509↩
Segment 06
Reform #1. Overturn Citizens United
The 2010 Citizens United decision held that the First Amendment prevents
the government from limiting independent political spending by
corporations and unions. The fifteen years since have produced the
consequences described in the section on equal political voice: the rise
of super PACs, the eightfold growth in outside spending, the $291 million
from a single donor in 2024, and the dominance of dark money in the
primaries that decide who serves in Congress. The decision strains the
principle that every citizen has an equal political voice, and as the
Bowman and Good primaries showed, it strains the principle that voters
choose their representatives as well.
Americans saw this coming. In the weeks after the decision was handed
down, 80 percent of the country said they opposed it, including 85
percent of Democrats, 81 percent of independents, and 76 percent of
Republicans.1 The position was not a partisan reaction to a Court
that had ruled in a particular direction. It was a near-consensus that
the country had gotten something fundamentally wrong about how money
should function in elections.
ABC News / Washington Post poll of 1,004 adults, February 4–8, 2010. Question wording: opposition to the Supreme Court's January 21, 2010 ruling allowing unlimited corporate and union spending in elections.
Fifteen years later, the position has held. In a 2018 University of
Maryland Program for Public Consultation survey of nearly 2,500
registered voters, roughly three-quarters of the country supported a
constitutional amendment to overturn the decision, with majorities across
party lines.2 More than four in five agreed that "the rich should
not have more influence just because they have more money."3 At the
state level, the demand has been organized and persistent: 22 states and
more than 800 cities and towns have passed resolutions or ballot
initiatives calling for an amendment.4
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, 2018 survey of 2,481 registered voters. Question wording: support for a constitutional amendment allowing Congress and the states to regulate the raising and spending of money in elections.
The amendment Americans are asking for has been written. The Democracy
For All Amendment, first introduced by Senator Tom Udall in 2013 and
reintroduced in every Congress since, would explicitly authorize Congress
and the states to set limits on the raising and spending of money in
elections, and would affirm that constitutional rights are the rights of
individual human beings rather than corporations or other artificial
entities.5
The path from introduction to ratification is a steep one. A
constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds vote in both the House
and Senate, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the state
legislatures. Only 27 amendments have cleared this bar in the country's
history, the most recent in 1992.6 The Democracy For All Amendment
came closest to clearing the first hurdle in September 2014, when Udall's
earlier version reached the Senate floor. The cloture vote was 54 to 42,
with every yea vote cast by a Democrat and every Republican voting
no.7 The amendment needed 60 votes to advance to a final vote, and
67 to pass. It got neither.
An amendment that three-quarters of the country supports has not, in
fifteen years, been able to advance past cloture. That is the shape of
the gap this paper is about, and it repeats across the six reforms that
follow.
Same source. The statement read to respondents was: "The rich should not have more influence just because they have more money." Eighty-eight percent agreed. ↩
The reform in the previous section would change how much money can be
spent and by whom. The reform in this one would change whether the public
knows who is doing the spending. One limits, the other illuminates. They
address the same principle from different angles, and the public broadly
supports both.
Dark money is the term for election spending by groups that are not
legally required to disclose their donors. Most of it flows through
501(c)(4) social welfare nonprofits and 501(c)(6) trade associations,
which under current IRS rules can spend nearly half of their budgets on
political activity without ever naming their funders. These groups can
then contribute to super PACs, which are legally required to disclose
their donors but only by the name on the check. When that name belongs
to a 501(c)(4) or a shell LLC, the super PAC's filings show the
intermediary, and the original donor stays hidden. Direct ad spending by
dark money groups peaked in 2012 and declined through the 2010s, as the
same groups increasingly routed their money through allied super PACs
instead. By 2024, super PAC contributions from undisclosed sources
accounted for $1.3 billion of the roughly $1.9 billion total, almost
double the 2020 cycle, and the most in any cycle since Citizens
United.1 Most of that spending would have been illegal before 2010.
OpenSecrets and Brennan Center analysis of FEC filings. Excludes TV and online ad spending not reported to the FEC.
The strangest thing about the current situation is that the Supreme
Court itself pointed to disclosure as the safeguard. The majority opinion
in Citizens United devoted several pages to it, arguing that the new
spending the Court was permitting would be acceptable because disclosure
would let citizens "see whether elected officials are 'in the pocket' of
so-called moneyed interests." Eight of the nine justices joined that
part of the opinion, including the four dissenters.2
Americans have been clear about what they want done. In a 2015 AP-NORC
poll asking whether all groups that raise and spend unlimited money to
support candidates should be required to publicly disclose their
contributors, 76 percent said yes, 23 percent said it was acceptable for
the information to remain private.3 A New York Times / CBS News
poll the same year found the same number on a near-identical question,
with 76 percent of Republicans and 76 percent of Democrats saying these
groups should publicly disclose.4
New York Times / CBS News poll, May 28–31, 2015, n=1,022 adults nationwide. Question asked whether groups spending money in a political campaign should disclose their contributors.
The federal reform Americans have been asking for has also been written.
The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
Act, known as the DISCLOSE Act, was first introduced in 2010 by Senator
Chuck Schumer and Representative Chris Van Hollen in response to
Citizens United, and it has been reintroduced in every Congress since.
The bill would require any organization spending more than $10,000 in an
election to publicly identify donors who contributed $10,000 or more,
close the routing loopholes that let money pass through intermediary
groups to obscure its source, and require shell companies engaged in
election spending to disclose their true owners.5
It came closest in the summer of 2010. The House passed it in June by a
vote of 219 to 206.6 In the Senate, where 60 votes were needed to
break a filibuster, no Republican voted to advance it, and the bill
failed on two cloture attempts that fall.7
In every Congress since, the same pattern has held. The last Senate
cloture vote, in September 2022, failed 49 to 49 on a strict party
line.8
The similarities between the two issues covered so far are, frankly,
absurd. Similar reasons for reform, similar support across party lines,
similar inaction in Congress, similar result.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), Part IV. Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZO.html↩
U.S. House of Representatives, Roll Call Vote 391, H.R. 5175 (DISCLOSE Act), June 24, 2010. Final passage 219 to 206. https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2010391↩
Forty-three percent of American adults identify as political
independents.1 In fifteen states, none of them can vote in the
primary that, in most congressional districts, decides who represents
them.2 The reform that would change that is straightforward: open
the primaries.
A January 2026 national survey by RealClear Opinion Research and Emerson
Polling found 71 percent of voters support requiring states to hold open
primaries, with 79 percent of Democrats, 70 percent of independents, and
65 percent of Republicans in agreement.3 Sixty-five percent said a
primary is a public election in which all voters should be able to
participate, whereas thirty-five percent said it is a party's internal
nomination process, restricted to members.4 In other words, the
public, largely, believes that primaries are akin to public elections,
even though, in fifteen states, the law treats them as something else.
RealClear Opinion Research / Emerson Polling national survey of 1,500 active registered voters, January 9–11, 2026, sponsored by the Unite America Institute.
The numbers are even higher among the voters who are directly impacted.
In a survey of independents in closed-primary states conducted by Change
Research for the Unite America Institute, 87 percent supported opening
primaries to independents, 77 percent called their exclusion unfair, and
74 percent called it a violation of voting rights.5
The Supreme Court has held that parties, not states, decide who votes in
primaries. In 1984, the Republican Party of Connecticut adopted a rule
allowing independents to vote in its primaries, only to find that a
state law required primary voters to be registered party members. The
party sued, and in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut (1986),
the Supreme Court ruled in the party's favor, holding that the state
could not force a political party to keep its primary closed when the
party itself wanted to open it.6 Closed primaries are not a
constitutional requirement. They persist because state legislatures and
party leadership, working together, choose to keep them that way.
There is no single federal bill to point at here the way there is for
the first two reforms, because primary rules are set by states, not by
Congress. Some states have opened their primaries through legislation;
others through ballot initiative. New Mexico opened its primaries to
independents in 2025.7 At the federal level, the bipartisan Let
America Vote Act, introduced in the House in 2024, would end closed
congressional and presidential primaries nationwide and provide funding
incentives for states to open their state and local primaries.8 It
has not advanced.
The principle that representatives are chosen by voters assumes that
voters have a vote worth casting. In closed-primary states, more than
seventeen million Americans do not. The next reform addresses a prior
question: who gets to be in your district in the first place, and who
gets to decide.
No comparable democracy in the world lets its sitting legislators draw
their own districts.1 In 2025, six states did exactly that. The
wave began in Texas, where Republican lawmakers redrew the state's
congressional map mid-decade to add five seats before the 2026
midterms.2 Missouri, North Carolina, California, Ohio, and Utah
followed within months.3 It was the largest off-cycle redistricting
cycle since the 1960s.4 Public reaction was unambiguous in every
poll taken at the time.
An NBC News Decision Desk poll of more than 30,000 adults, conducted as
Texas was finalizing its new map, found that 82 percent of Americans
prefer that congressional districts be drawn by nonpartisan commissions
rather than by the party in power.5 The number held across partisan
lines and across state political contexts. In Republican-controlled
states, 71 percent of Republicans preferred nonpartisan commissions. In
Democratic-controlled states, 88 percent of Democrats preferred the
same.6 Even when their own party stood to benefit from
gerrymandering, voters of both parties said they would rather it stopped.
A separate national poll conducted in the same weeks by Noble Predictive
Insights for Common Cause found 77 percent of voters supporting
independent commissions over state legislators.7 Fifty-seven percent
of Republicans, 76 percent of Democrats, and 72 percent of independents
said it is bad for the country when one political party controls how
districts are drawn.8 Sixty percent of voters who supported Donald
Trump in 2024 told the same pollster that Congress should step in to
stop mid-decade redistricting.9
Noble Predictive Insights national survey of 2,016 registered voters, August 26 – September 2, 2025, commissioned by Common Cause.
Where voters have been given a direct ballot choice on the question,
they have answered consistently. Redistricting reform appeared on the
ballot in five states in 2018, and every measure passed. Ohio approved
Issue 1 with 75 percent of the vote in May.10 In November, Colorado
approved Amendments Y and Z with 71 percent each,11 Michigan
approved Proposal 2 with 61 percent,12 Missouri approved Amendment
1 with 62 percent,13 and Utah approved Proposition 4 with 50.3
percent.14
Ohio, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, and Utah Secretaries of State, official 2018 election returns. Colorado figure is for Amendment Y; Amendment Z passed with the same share.
In every case the reform was approved by voters, and in two of the five
it was rolled back or weakened afterward by state legislators. In 2020,
Missouri's General Assembly referred Amendment 3 to the ballot, undoing
most of the redistricting changes voters had approved two years
earlier.15 Utah's legislature passed Senate Bill 200 the same year,
weakening the commission and giving lawmakers authority to override its
maps.16 The Utah Supreme Court ruled in 2024 that the legislature
had acted unconstitutionally, and in 2025 and 2026 the legislature
attempted to repeal Proposition 4 outright through a ballot measure that
ultimately failed to qualify.17 When voters approve redistricting
reform, the legislators whose seats it affects often do not accept the
result.
The federal reform that would address this has been written and
reintroduced for fifteen years. The For the People Act, H.R. 1 in the
117th Congress, required every state to establish an independent
redistricting commission to draw congressional maps and banned
mid-decade redistricting nationally. It passed the Democratic-controlled
House on March 3, 2021, by a vote of 220 to 210, with every Republican
voting against.18 In the Senate, a motion to begin debate failed on
a 50 to 50 party-line vote on June 22, 2021, with every Republican
opposed and every Democrat in favor, ten votes short of the 60 needed to
invoke cloture.19 A revised version, the Freedom to Vote Act, came
up for cloture on January 19, 2022, and failed 49 to 51 on a
substantively party-line vote, again with every Republican opposed.20 A subsequent motion to allow a
talking-filibuster carve-out for voting rights legislation failed 48 to
52, with Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema, both Democrats,
joining every Republican in voting against the rule change.21
The bill has been reintroduced in every Congress since. The most recent
version, the Redistricting Reform Act of 2025, was introduced on
September 18, 2025, by Representative Zoe Lofgren in the House and
Senator Alex Padilla in the Senate.22 At the time of writing, the
House version had 55 cosponsors and the Senate version had three.23
No Republicans have signed on. Both bills sit in the Judiciary
Committee.24
Eight in ten Americans want what the bill would do, and the legislators
whose seats depend on the lines are the ones being asked to give up the
pen.
U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote 9, 117th Congress, 2nd Session, January 19, 2022. The recorded vote was 49 to 51; Majority Leader Charles Schumer switched his vote to "no" at the end so he could move to reconsider under Senate rules, making the substantive partisan split 50 Democrats and independents in favor and 50 Republicans against. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1172/vote_117_2_00009.htm↩
Eighty-six percent of Americans want it banned, and they have wanted it
banned for as long as anyone has thought to ask. The issue covered is one
of the few questions in American political life on which Republicans and
Democrats agree by margins that pollsters rarely see on anything else. In
a 2023 University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation survey of
more than 2,500 registered voters, 87 percent of Republicans, 88 percent
of Democrats, and 81 percent of independents said members of Congress
should be prohibited from owning or trading individual stocks in
companies.1 Subsequent polling by Data for Progress, the Campaign
Legal Center, RealClear, and several news organizations has produced
numbers within a percentage point or two in either direction.2 On
almost no other question of American politics is the cross-partisan
margin this wide or this stable.
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, national survey of 2,533 registered voters, 2023. Question wording: support for prohibiting Members of Congress from owning or trading stocks in individual companies.
The bipartisan ridicule of the practice has become its own minor genre
of American commentary. In May 2024, the comedian Jon Stewart,
guest-hosting The Daily Show, replayed a press-conference clip in
which then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi had defended congressional trading as
the workings of a free market.3 "In a free market, everyone has
access to the same information," Stewart said. "So unless you're going
to put all of us on the committees, I don't get it."4 Eighteen
months later, at a January 2026 press conference in Clearwater, Florida
governor Ron DeSantis described members of Congress who "get elected
having never shown any investment acumen ever in their life, and then
all of a sudden, they become Warren Buffett on steroids."5
The clearest sign that congressional trading has become a settled
feature of American economic life is that Wall Street has built
financial products around it. In February 2023, an asset manager called
Subversive Capital launched two exchange-traded funds designed to mirror
the disclosed trades of members of Congress.6 The fund tracking
Democratic members was given the ticker NANC, in honor of Pelosi. The
fund tracking Republican members was given the ticker KRUZ, in honor of
Senator Ted Cruz.7
What has not happened is a vote. The current vehicle in the Senate is
the HONEST Act, negotiated by Hawley with Democratic Senators Gary
Peters, Jeff Merkley, and Jon Ossoff. The bill would ban members of
Congress, the president, the vice president, and their spouses and
dependent children from holding or trading covered investments, require
divestment beginning in 2027, and raise the late-filing penalty under
the STOCK Act from $200 to $500.8 It passed the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on July 30, 2025, with
Hawley joining every Democrat on the committee and every other
Republican voting against.9 President Trump first said he would
"absolutely" sign the bill, then attacked it on Truth Social the night
after the committee vote, then walked back to "conceptual" support the
following day.10 No floor vote has been scheduled.
The current vehicle in the House is the Restore Trust in Congress Act,
introduced in September 2025 by Representatives Chip Roy, a Texas
Republican, and Seth Magaziner, a Rhode Island Democrat, and cosponsored
by 126 members from both parties, ranging from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
to Lauren Boebert.11 On December 2, 2025, Representative Anna
Paulina Luna, a Florida Republican, filed a discharge petition to bypass
leadership and force a floor vote.12 A discharge petition requires
the signatures of 218 members. As of January 2026, the petition had
79.13
Eighty-six percent of the country wants the practice banned. The bills
have been written and rewritten, renamed and renegotiated, introduced
in every Congress for more than a decade. The names of the lead sponsors
include senators of both parties, a sitting Republican governor, two of
the three most recent presidents, and the current Democratic minority
leader of the House.14 No version of the
bill has reached the floor of either chamber.
When a member of Congress leaves office, federal law does not let them
begin lobbying their former colleagues right away. A former member of
the House must wait one year; a former senator must wait two.1
This is the cooling-off period. The restriction on members of Congress
dates to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, built on the theory that a brief
enforced distance between holding office and selling access to it would
blunt the conflict of interest the revolving door otherwise creates.2
A year is shorter than a single session of Congress. When the waiting
period ends, the committee assignments are the same, the staff are the
same, the leadership is the same, and the relationships a departing
member spent a career building are all still in place. As discussed
earlier in the section on representatives' obligations to their
constituents, nearly two-thirds of the members of the 115th Congress who
left for the private sector
took jobs in the influence business, and the committee chairs and party
leaders were the most likely to make the move. A pause measured in
months does not interrupt that pattern.
A majority of Americans would like to see this cooling-off period
extended. In the 2022 University of Maryland Program for Public
Consultation survey, the same series that produced the figures on stock
trading and Citizens United, respondents were given a briefing on the
current rule and asked to weigh the arguments for and against extending
it. Sixty-five percent favored lengthening the cooling-off period to
five years, including sixty-five percent of Republicans and sixty-seven
percent of Democrats.3 Support held across the political map; in
both the most Republican and the most Democratic districts, large
majorities favored the longer wait.4 PPC had asked a similar
question in 2017 and found seventy-seven percent in favor.5
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, national survey of 2,606 registered voters, June 2022. Question wording: support for extending the post-employment lobbying ban on former Members of Congress to five years.
The same survey marks where the agreement stops. Offered the option of
going further, to a permanent lifetime ban on former members lobbying at
all, only thirty-two percent agreed.6 What Americans broadly
support is a longer wait rather than a closed door, and the distinction
matters, because the legislation now drawing the most attention asks for
the closed door.
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, national survey of 2,606 registered voters, June 2022. Respondents were offered the five-year extension and, as a further option, a permanent lifetime lobbying ban.
A five-year cooling-off period has been written into bills repeatedly.
The Public Service Integrity Act in the House and the Cleaning up
Washington Act in the Senate both proposed extending the ban on former
members to a uniform five years, along with a longer restriction on
senior congressional staff.7 Neither advanced. Since the 117th
Congress, the five-year proposal has had no prominent vehicle, and the
legislative attention on the revolving door has moved past it. In July
2025, Representatives Joe Neguse and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced
the Close the Revolving Door Act, which would impose a lifetime lobbying
ban on former members.8 In May 2026, Senators Elizabeth Warren and
Rick Scott introduced the BLAST Act, which would do the same, replacing
the cooling-off periods with a permanent ban and authorizing the Justice
Department to pursue criminal penalties for violations.9 The BLAST
Act pairs one of the Senate's most progressive members with a close ally
of President Trump. Neither bill has received a floor vote.
On most of the reforms in these pages, the public has settled on a
position and Congress has declined to act on it. Here the public settled
on a five-year wait, and Congress has passed neither that nor the longer
ban some of its members now propose instead. The waiting period a former
representative faces today is the same one year it has been since 1989.
Program for Public Consultation, lobbying policy survey, 2022. ↩
Identified by the Program for Public Consultation as the bills, current at the time of its 2022 survey, that would extend the post-employment lobbying ban to five years. ↩
Since 2000, exactly one hundred former members of Congress have gone to
work for foreign governments.1 They have represented the interests
of nearly half the countries on earth. Turkey has hired the most, sixteen
of them, followed by South Korea with twelve and Taiwan with eleven, then
China and Saudi Arabia with eight apiece.2 The two governments just
behind Turkey are democracies, but they are the exception. Across all
hundred former members, eighty-five percent registered as agents of
governments that Freedom House rates "not free" or "partly free."3
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft analysis of Foreign Agents Registration Act filings, “The Well-Traveled Road from Member of Congress to Foreign Agent,” June 2022.
This is the same revolving door described earlier, with one turn added.
The Exit Interview section followed Dick Gephardt from championing
recognition of the Armenian genocide in Congress to signing a contract,
after he left, with the government of Turkey to help defeat the
recognition resolution. Gephardt was an early entry in a long pattern,
one the Quincy Institute, drawing on Foreign Agents Registration Act
filings, counted to exactly one hundred by 2026. The work is legal, and
it is disclosed. FARA, passed in 1938 to track foreign propaganda,
requires an American working for a foreign government to register with
the Justice Department and file what he is being paid to do.4 It
stops there. A former House member waits one year before lobbying his
old colleagues, a former senator two; once the wait is over, a foreign
government may hire him on the same terms as a trade association or a
drug company. The filing goes in, and that is the whole of the safeguard.
The filing can make for strange reading. In December 2024, as Pete
Hegseth's nomination for secretary of defense neared a contested Senate
vote, a former Republican senator named Norm Coleman served as his guide
on Capitol Hill, escorting the nominee through meetings with the
senators whose votes would decide the confirmation.5 Coleman was a
registered lobbyist for the government of Saudi Arabia, working through
Hogan Lovells, a firm the Saudi embassy had paid roughly $2.7 million in
2019.6 A former United States senator, on a foreign government's
payroll, was helping to seat the man who would run the American
military. Every part of it was disclosed, and every part of it was
lawful.
Americans, asked about the practice, want it stopped. In the 2022
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation survey, the
series behind the figures on stock trading and the lobbying cool-off
period, seventy-one percent of respondents said former senior officials
should be barred for life from lobbying for a foreign government, with
71 percent of Republicans and 74 percent of Democrats agreeing.7
PPC asked the question about former executive branch officials, the
group named in the bill it was testing. The legislation that has
gathered the most support since reaches former members of Congress and
retired military officers too.
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, national survey of 2,606 registered voters, June 2022. Question concerned barring former senior executive branch officials from ever lobbying on behalf of a foreign government.
Several versions of that legislation exist. Jared Golden and Mike
Gallagher wrote one in 2021, the Congressional and Executive Foreign
Lobbying Ban, which would bar former members of Congress, senior
executive officials, and retired generals and admirals from ever
registering as foreign agents.8 The bipartisan Fighting Foreign
Influence Act, six sponsors split evenly between the parties, would do
the same and also require American think tanks to disclose large gifts
from foreign governments.9 Both have sat without a floor vote.
One related bill has moved. The CLEAR Path Act, from Senators John
Cornyn and Peter Welch, would bar former senior executive officials from
lobbying for a short list of adversary nations: China, Russia, Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba. It passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in
January 2026 with votes from both parties.10 Its reach is narrow by
design. It covers no former members of Congress, and the list of five
adversaries leaves out Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the two governments
that have hired the most of them. The hundred former lawmakers this
section began with would be free to keep working under a CLEAR Path Act
signed into law tomorrow. The bill written to reach them has been
introduced and reintroduced across multiple Congresses, and not once
has it been called for a vote.
Nick Cleveland-Stout and Ben Freeman, "The Well-Traveled Road from Member of Congress to Foreign Agent," Responsible Statecraft, June 28, 2022. Note: the per-country counts (Turkey 16, etc.) reflect this 2022 analysis when the total was approximately 90; the April 2026 update raised the total to 100 but did not publish revised per-country counts. ↩
A small bloc of voters, a few dozen close races, and the consent of the governed working as designed.
Segment 13
How we bridge the gap
Americans do not like their Congress. Gallup has been asking the same
question since 1974, do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is
handling its job, and the answer, averaged across half a century, is
that 28 percent of the country approves and 65 percent disapproves.1
The all-time high was 84 percent, recorded in October 2001, in the weeks
after the September 11 attacks.2 The all-time low was 9 percent,
recorded in November 2013, during a federal government shutdown.3
As of April 2026, approval stood at 10 percent, barely above the floor
of Gallup's trend.4 Approval has been mostly underwater since the
series began, with brief stretches of net-positive readings in the late
1980s, the late 1990s, and the months after the September 11 attacks.5
Gallup, “Congress and the Public” tracker, news.gallup.com/poll/1600. All polls, April 1974–May 2026.
This is the institution that the seven preceding sections have argued
represents Americans poorly, and the public has been reaching the same
conclusion for as long as anyone has been keeping track. A reader who
has made it this far might reasonably wonder whether anything can be
done about it.
Something can.
The problem is not what the country wants. The country knows what it
wants, has known for half a century, and tells pollsters the same thing
in every survey that asks. Eighty-six percent want congressional stock
trading banned.6 Seventy-five percent want a constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United.7 Seventy-six percent want
dark-money disclosure.8 Seventy-one percent want open primaries.9
Eighty-two percent want districts drawn by independent commissions.10
Two-thirds want a longer cooling-off period before former members can
lobby.11 Seven in ten want a permanent ban on lobbying for foreign
governments.12 These are not contested questions. They are settled
in the country and unsettled only in Washington.
The problem is coordination. Each of these reforms commands a
cross-partisan supermajority among voters, and each of them faces
cross-partisan opposition among the members of Congress who would have
to pass them. Republicans and Democrats vote against the congressional
stock-trading ban. Republicans and Democrats vote against the DISCLOSE
Act. Republicans and Democrats accept board seats from the industries
they used to regulate. The reforms are not blocked because the country
is divided on them. The country is not divided on them. They are blocked
because the people who want them have not yet acted together at the
ballot box on what they share, rather than separately on what divides
them.
The bridge across it is the act of consenting together, in the only
forum where consent is registered with binding effect: the elections
that decide who serves.
Most American congressional races are not close. The average House race
in 2024 was decided by 27 points, and the average Senate race by 17.13
But the average is not the whole picture. The chamber is more contested
than the averages suggest. In 2024, 37 House seats were decided by fewer
than five points, and another 31 by margins between five and ten points.
That is 68 House seats, roughly one in six, where the outcome was within
reach of a small shift in the electorate.14
FairVote, “Monopoly Politics 2026,” April 2025; Ballotpedia, 2024 congressional margin of victory analysis. 29 of the 256 seats in the 20+ point bucket were uncontested.
The Senate is proportionally more competitive. Of the 35 Senate seats
up for election in 2024, six were decided by fewer than five points and
another five by margins between five and ten points. That is 11 of 35,
or nearly one in three.15
Ballotpedia, “Congressional elections decided by 10 percentage points or fewer,” January 2025. Includes 33 regular U.S. Senate elections and two special elections held November 5, 2024.
In any of these races, a bloc of voters organized around reform support,
willing to set aside the partisan question for a single cycle, could
decide the outcome. The bloc does not have to be large. The average
margin in the 37 closest House races of 2024 was a little over two
points. Across all 37 districts combined, the total margin of victory
was roughly 350,000 votes. About 175,000 voters choosing differently
would have flipped every race within five points.16 That
figure assumes no new voters show up. It assumes the people who chose
not to vote in 2024 still choose not to vote. It assumes the entire
shift comes from voters who already cast a ballot deciding, for one
cycle, that reform support mattered more than the party label.
One hundred seventy-five thousand voters is roughly the population of a
single mid-sized American city, in a country of 340 million. It is about
one-tenth of one percent of all registered voters. It is, by any
reasonable measure, a small number of people.
The same math applies in the Senate. Across the eleven Senate races
within ten points in 2024, the median margin was under three points, and
the combined margin across the five closest was under 200,000 votes
against aggregate turnout exceeding 25 million.17 In any given
Senate cycle, three or four seats are close enough that a coordinated
bloc of voters acting on reform support could decide them.
The cumulative effect is what matters. Replace a handful of reform
opponents with reform supporters in one cycle, and the bills the
previous Congress refused to vote on suddenly have a closer path to the
floor. Replace another handful in the next cycle, and the calculation
changes for everyone still in office. A member of Congress who watches
three colleagues lose because their record on these reforms became the
deciding factor in their race will think differently about the next
vote. Some will cave to the demand and vote for the reforms. Some will
lose their seats. Either outcome is consent of the governed, working as
designed.
To make that practical, Project Curia is a free website that shows users
where their representatives stand on each of the seven reforms in this
paper. Visitors enter a zip code and see, for their House member and
both of their senators, a record of votes, cosponsorships, and public
positions on the congressional stock-trading ban, the constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United, the DISCLOSE Act, open
primaries, redistricting reform, the lobbying cooling-off period, and
the foreign-lobbying ban. The website does not tell anyone how to vote.
It shows the underlying record and lets readers draw their own
conclusions.
What it does, more than anything, is lower the cost of coordinating.
The polling has been clear for half a century. The legislation has been
written and reintroduced in Congress after Congress. The state ballot
measures have passed by margins that other reforms rarely see. What has
been missing is the connection between the strength of the public's view
and the votes that decide who serves. The website exists to close that
distance, district by district.
This paper began with a question. Putting aside partisanship, what would
we like our politics to be? The pages between then and now have laid
out, in some detail, what most Americans say they would like it to be:
a politics in which every citizen has an equal political voice, in
which voters choose their representatives, and in which representatives
are beholden to the people who elected them. None of those is an
unreasonable aspiration. All of them have been written into the
country's founding documents, reaffirmed by amendment, and stated as
constitutional doctrine. The work that remains is to bring the practice
back into line with the principle, and the path to doing so runs through
a few hundred thousand voters in a few dozen races, in elections that
take place every two years.
The country has wanted this for a long time. It is closer than it may
seem.
Author's calculation. Across the 37 House races decided by fewer than five points in 2024, the combined margin of victory across all 37 races was roughly 350,000 votes. Flipping every race requires closing that gap, which under the simplifying assumption that voters switch sides (rather than abstain or be newly mobilized) means about 175,000 voters changing their vote — since each switch shifts the margin by two. ↩
Ballotpedia, "Election results, 2024: Congressional elections decided by 10 percentage points or fewer," January 25, 2025. ↩