The question
Whether a federal obstruction statute, enacted after the Enron scandal, covers conduct like that of January 6 defendants who were charged with obstructing an official proceeding.
Fischer v. United States
What the Court decided
The Court narrowed a federal obstruction law used against many January 6 defendants. It held the statute reaches only conduct that impairs the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding, not any conduct that obstructs a proceeding. The case was sent back to apply that narrower reading.
How the justices split
6-3The Court's opinion
Roberts, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Jackson
Read in context, the obstruction provision is about tampering with evidence, records, or objects, because it sits next to a subsection about documents. It does not sweep in every act that disrupts a proceeding, so the government must show the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of things used in the proceeding.
Concurring
Jackson, writing alone
Jackson joined the Court and wrote separately to stress that the statute grew out of the Enron document-shredding scandal, which supports reading it as an evidence-tampering law.
Dissenting
Barrett, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan
The dissent argued the statute's text is broad and plainly covers obstructing a proceeding by other means, and that the majority rewrote a clear law to narrow it. It read the ordinary meaning of the words to reach the charged conduct.
How we know · 3 sourced claims
The Court held Section 1512(c)(2) requires the government to show the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding.
Source: syllabus, Held, at 23-5572
The Court read the obstruction provision in the context of the neighboring evidence-tampering subsection.
Source: opinion of the Court (Roberts, C.J.)
Roberts, C.J., wrote for the Court; Barrett, J., dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.
Source: syllabus, lineup